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September, 2007,
Volume 11, Number
11
CONTENTS
More than Rank: On Coming of Age as a Marine Corps
Leader
By Captain Erik Orient, USMC
Recovering Post-War Europe: The Leadership of George C.
Marshall
By Greg Behrman
Leading for the Next Act: Why
CEOs Must Evolve or Step Aside
Knowledge@Wharton
Learnership: At Toyota,
Success Is a Time for Reflection
By Matt May
Opinion: Want
to Be President? Start by
Managing Your Own Campaign
By John Baldoni
MORE THAN RANK: On Coming of Age as a Marine Corps
Leader
 By
Captain Erik Orient, USMC
When I was a
student in 2005 at the Marine Corps’s Expeditionary
Warfare School in Quantico, Va., then-Lieutenant General
James Conway, who today serves as Commandant of the
Marine Corps, told myself and my classmates that power
derives not from rank but from relationships. After 16
years as a Marine, eight years as an officer and eight
months on duty in Iraq, I am finally coming to
understand the wisdom behind those words.
Until three or
four years ago, when I started teaching leadership at
the Marine Corps’ Officer Candidate School in Quantico,
Va., I was like most Marines: I thought the Corps had
cornered the market on leadership. Any leadership
civilians did was merely “management.” But as I began to
encounter more academic and business professionals
through my teaching work, I became more introspective,
reevaluating my own leadership style.
Rather that
being a set of techniques patented by the Marine Corps,
I learned, leadership is about people. And most people I
know share some common characteristics: They want to be
part of a winning team; they want to be appreciated;
they want support and love; they want their opinions to
matter; they want to be treated fairly; and they want to
work for the common good. Selfishness and other poor
parts of our nature also exist – I’m not naïve enough to
deny that – but I do believe that folks are inherently
good, and that a credible leader will bring out the best
in them.
Looking back,
then, I realized I missed some great leadership
opportunities in my career. As a leader, I’ve always
worked hard to care for the Marines under my command,
but I was never good at building rapport and
establishing meaningful relationships. I was able to
accomplish things because I had a reputation as a
quality individual, but never because people enjoyed
working with me. Marines wouldn’t go out of their way to
strike up a conversation with me, and I would never take
the time to just see how they were doing. I was all
business, all the time. In that sense, I fell victim to
the big lie in the Corps: that to be good, you must
always be hard as nails. Yes, being physically and
mentally tough is essential to being a Marine, but it is
only half the equation.
During my last
year as an instructor at Quantico and then during a year
at Expeditionary Warfare School, I focused on becoming
more of a people person. I’m still uncomfortable in
crowds, and small talk often bores the hell out of me,
but I have realized that just spending a minute or two
asking a Marine about his day, his hometown, his wife,
or his favorite food can open the door to a
relationship. As Dale Carnegie writes, if you get
someone to talk about themselves, you’ve already won.
Leadership in
the Field: Unexpected Roles
For the past
eight months, I have served in various parts of Anbar
Province, in Western Iraq, as Assistant Operations
Officer for Task Force Tarawa. In a normal situation, my
job would simply be helping the Operations Officer
coordinate Task Force personnel for combat operations,
logistic patrols, and engineering projects. Task Force
Tarawa is not normal, however.
For one thing,
we are incredibly short-staffed. We took over our post
from a group that had 30 percent more personnel than we
do. In addition to my regular responsibilities, I have
also found myself in charge of administering the guard
force at Camp Korean Village (a Marine base in Anbar
Province), overseeing all detainee operations, and
acting as a liaison between my staff and 15 other
commands, units and sections at the Camp. Unexpectedly,
my key role within Task Force Tarawa has been as a
bridge builder, fence mender and mediator.
My Task Force
was assembled on a very short timeline – just two weeks
– and it brought together disparate units that had never
worked together. A more typical Task Force is formed and
trained over the course of several months before being
deployed to combat. During this training period, the
intricacies of command relationships are worked out,
reporting procedures are established, and distribution
of tasks is determined. In our case, we skipped this
entire portion and instead created an ad hoc command
element. We had to remove people from assignments for
which they had training and place them in new jobs for
which they had none. To say there were some growing
pains would be an understatement.
Out in the
field, familiar, linear organizational diagrams were
quickly replaced with ones that resembled spider webs.
Companies still report to battalions who still report to
regiments, but overlaid on these old reporting
constructs are new ones, often with vexingly vague names
like “supporting,” “coordinating” or “partnered”
relationships. Much of what we do now depends on
commanders working together in situations where neither
is really in charge of the other.
Lately I have
realized that I accomplish little through official
means; my influence is derived from forging good
relationships with the people I have to deal with on a
daily basis. I’ve learned that getting results is less a
function of what you are selling than how you sell it.
Having rank on my side, I have the option to simply
order a Marine to do something, and I can realistically
expect action to follow soon thereafter. This may be an
adequate way to get results, but it is no way to garner
respect or cooperation. Marines are great at following
orders, but not even Marines get excited about providing
a win for the other guy alone. Creating a win-win
scenario means getting others to believe in what you are
selling and want it for themselves.
Getting the
Job Done with a Handshake
In my Area of
Operations, we had a handful of Marines stationed along
the Iraqi/Syrian border who were having serious problems
with their generators, their only supply of electrical
power. Without power, Marines would have lost their
satellite communications network, which is their only
way to keep in touch with us should they be attacked,
injured or need any other support.
Our Task Force
had no extra generators to spare. The only folks I knew
who could help were Kellogg, Brown, & Root (KBR), a
Halliburton subsidiary that provides life support and
services for military installations over here. Supplying
an extra generator to this border station was outside of
KBR’s contractual responsibilities, and, unfortunately,
our relationship with them had been badly soured by a
member of my staff who behaved, shall we say, quite
negatively toward them on a regular basis. I knew I
didn’t have much chance of securing KBR’s help, but all
that mattered to me right then was getting a generator
to Marines who needed it.
I set up a
meeting with a KBR manager, and after I introduced
myself, I noticed he sounded like he was from the South.
I asked him where home was, when he was going to get
there on leave, and then just let the conversation
develop. After some time, I said, “Hey man, there has
been some bad blood between my organization and yours,
but I want to fix that. I know you are busy and I
wouldn’t bother you unless it was really important. I
have some Marines who are in a really bad spot. I’m
asking you for a favor that I probably can’t repay with
anything other than a handshake.” I explained the
situation to him. He told me he wasn’t really allowed to
help me, but that if we kept it quiet no one would be
the wiser. He gave me a generator five minutes later.
Finesse over
Force
The traditional
chain-of command structure has always served the Marines
well: It is essential when you need immediate results.
There is a downside, however. Depending on rank alone to
determine leadership downplays the value of competence
and respect. Having a subordinate follow orders is not
an affirmation of leadership; getting buy-in and willing
cooperation from peers, juniors, and seniors without
flexing rank muscles is. When the solid vertical lines
of organizational charts are replaced with intersecting
dotted and dashed ones, today’s Marine leaders had best
be able to rely on more than what is on their collars.
Authority is
born of rank and position, but true power and influence
come from getting along with people. It would be nice,
but also exceedingly naïve, to think personalities are
irrelevant in a professional organization, and that all
players will rally for the big win. Personal agendas,
experiences, and moods all affect the level of support
we provide to one another. Although many Marines state
with bravado they did not join the Marine Corps to make
friends, they might want to consider friendship-forging
skills a priority.
As Marines, we
have to learn to distinguish when to use force and when
to use finesse.
When dealing
with the enemy, there is no time for negotiating. With
co-workers and comrades, however, a little bit of
rapport can go a long way. It took me far too long to
realize that relationships among Marines of all ranks
are truly the key to power, influence, and progress,
regardless of what formal reporting structures exist.
Sometimes the hardest lessons to learn are the ones that
should be the easiest to see.
Author's
Note: Captain Erik Orient joined the Marine
Corps in 1991 and received his officer commission in
1999. A former instructor at the Officer Candidate
School in Quantico, Va., he holds a Master’s Degree in
Human Relations from Oklahoma University and is
currently serving his second tour of duty for the Global
War on Terrorism. He
can be reached at
Erik.Orient@kv.mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil.
RECOVERING POST-WAR EUROPE: The Leadership of George C.
Marshall
By Greg Behrman
 Greg
Behrman, author of
The Invisible People
(2004), an account of America’s response to the AIDS
epidemic, has just published a new account of the
Marshall Plan. In
The Most Noble
Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America
Helped Save Europe (Simon & Schuster,
2007), he chronicles how George C. Marshall and others
including Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan, William L.
Clayton, and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg led the
creation of the massive U.S. program to assist the
economic recovery of post-War Europe. What follows is an
excerpt from the book, reprinted with permission of the
publisher.
It has been suggested by
some historians that George Marshall was a figurehead
of the Marshall Plan. Such portrayals are inaccurate. It
was Marshall who took Stalin’s measure at the Moscow
Conference in March and April 1947, and returned
resolved to bolster Western Europe against the internal
and external Communist threat. He personally recruited
Acheson and Kennan and trusted Clayton, and deputized
them, and pushed the State Department to work toward a
plan for European recovery. Heeding Clayton’s call in
late May, Marshall determined that the time had come for
action. Without consulting Truman on the final contents
of which he, and he alone, rendered final determination
upon – Marshall selected the time and place for the
address, and presented it as an invitation to Europe.
 In
the month to follow, Marshall lent the full force of his
being, his energies and his prestige to the Plan to
ensure its passage through Congress. Marshall labored
diligently and adroitly to construct one of the most
extraordinary bipartisan foreign policy collaborations
in American history. He testified often and ably. Then,
with the Plan’s passage still in the balance, Marshall
toured the country, trumpeting the dire strategic,
economic and humanitarian need for the Marshall Plan. It
would not have been possible without his vision, his
will, his tactical dexterity, his collaboration with
Vandenberg, his efforts with Congress and the American
people – and his prestige. It was called the Marshall
Plan because of political expedience. But it could not
rightly have been called anything else.
Marshall had led America and the Allies in war. He
delivered victory. But victory in war did not achieve
the overriding U.S. strategic objective: prevention of
the domination of the Eurasian landmass by a
totalitarian power. By the time it ended in 1951, the
Marshall Plan and NATO had decisively secured Western
Europe in the U.S. orbit. The Cold War and the Soviet
threat would remain for decades. But, Soviet domination
of Eurasia was no longer a viable possibility. The
objective for which the war had been fought was
achieved, and the Marshall Plan helped to realize it. To
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: “These achievements in war
and peace justify the statement that General George
Marshall stands out as the greatest American of the 20th
century.”
By 1953 the general had fallen ill. In early December
1953, though, he left his sickbed in Leesburg to venture
across the Atlantic Ocean one last time. On the
afternoon of December 10, in Oslo, Norway, Marshall
arrived at a resplendent hall outfitted in white tie and
tails. He had come to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. He
was the first – and the only – professional soldier ever
to receive it. He was not receiving the honor for his
role in war, the Nobel representative reading the
citation said, but for his work in the cause of peace.
LEADING FOR THE NEXT ACT: Why CEOs Must Evolve or Step
Aside
Note: The
article originally appeared in the Aug. 8, 2007, edition
of
Knowledge@Wharton.
Have
you ever seen a mother come up and smooth the hair of
her older teenager, to the chagrin and irritation of the
teen, who says, “Come on, Mom, I’m not a kid anymore.”
It’s an awkward moment: The parent has failed to
recognize that overseeing her child’s appearance, once a
good practice, is now inappropriate.
It is
common sense that parents must adapt and change their
roles as children grow up. But what about CEOs, who may
be hired for one task, but face an entirely different
one years or even months later?
 The
secret to long-term CEO success, suggests David Nadler,
a consultant to boards and senior executives, is
conceiving of a CEO’s tenure as a performance with a
series of distinct acts. “Each act requires the CEO to
lead, think and behave in fundamentally different ways.
The successful ones are those who are able to make the
transitions,” Nadler said during his presentation at the
11th annual Wharton Leadership Conference,
sponsored by the
Center for Leadership and Change Management,
the Center for Human Resources and
Wharton Executive Education. The theme of the
conference was “Developing Leadership Talent.”
According to Nadler’s model, a CEO’s tenure follows a
“natural arc,” which begins when the CEO takes the
stage, prepared or not for his or her new role, and has
to solve the problems presented. “In almost every CEO
succession I’ve seen, it isn’t a case of, ‘Here’s the
company; it’s going great, don’t screw it up.’ Usually
there is some crisis or strategic challenge, and the
CEO’s job is to figure out how to respond.” Often, says
Nadler, a CEO may be hired precisely because he or she
is perceived to be strong in the area where the company
most needs help, whether that be changing the culture or
bringing innovation.
“The
problem comes after the CEO solves that first issue;
then it is act two and something else is needed,” he
says. Many CEOs fail because of what Nadler terms
“success syndrome,” that is, codifying a certain way of
doing things, and then charging ahead with the old game
plan no matter how the context has changed.
Exiting Stage
Right
To
make the point, Nadler referred to the
five-and-a-half-year tenure of Carly Fiorina as CEO of
Hewlett-Packard. Although her controversial acquisition
of Compaq and high-profile firing in 2005 led many
critics to say she failed entirely as CEO, Nadler
asserted that, in his view, Fiorina actually made the
right moves, at least early on in her leadership. “In
act one, she was required to create a transformation at
HP, develop a new strategy, break the static elements
and reshape the business through the acquisition,” says
Nadler. “Given that [current CEO] Mark Hurd has kept the
same fundamental strategy, she probably did the right
things.”
Fiorina’s problems began, adds Nadler, when her act one
concluded, and a new task emerged -- execution. A
“hunkering down,” not a CEO in the limelight, was needed
to get the job done. “Instead, she continued on the same
approach, and the leadership model that had been
successful in act one killed her in act two.”
For a
counterpoint to Fiorina’s failure, Nadler looked to E.
Stanley O’Neal, who took the helm of Merrill Lynch just
three months after the terrorist attacks of 9/11
literally blew the business advisory company out of its
global headquarters in Manhattan. Unfortunately for
O’Neal, the business’s problems ran deeper and were
reflected in a low stock price and rumors of a takeover.
O’Neal approached this set of challenges with a
management style Nadler described as “demanding, almost
brutal at times”; he focused relentlessly on control,
discipline and cost. “His feeling was, ‘I have to save
the company. If I don’t do this, we’ll be finished and
thousands of jobs will be gone.’”
The
company began to recover, however, and by the fall of
2003, O’Neal did something different: He changed his
entire executive team, focused on growth and rethought
his own leadership style. Today, says Nadler, with
Merrill Lynch stock trading at nearly three times the
amount it did in 2001, O’Neal is focusing on building up
the next generation of leaders. For example, he created
two co-presidents who operate alongside him as co-CEOs
and now “conceives of his job primarily as being a
mentor, coach and supporter,” says Nadler.
What
leaders who successfully transition from one act to the
next share is an awareness of what kind of leadership is
required at the right moment -- and they don’t rest on
their laurels. According to Nadler, O’Neal appreciates
his past success, but continues to worry about missing
other transitions in the future. This is because even
CEOs who manage to navigate multiple acts will find
themselves with a final challenge: exiting the stage
successfully. It’s a task that usually means answering
the question: “Did I leave the business with effective
leadership?”
“The Death
Spiral”
Nadler knows something about being a long-lived leader.
He founded Delta Consulting Group in 1980 and ran that
company for 25 years. Several years after Delta joined
Marsh & McLennan Companies to become Mercer Delta
Consulting in 2000, Nadler says, “I looked around and
realized the only CEO in power longer than me was Fidel
Castro.”
After
planning for his succession, he retired in 2005 -- only
to be drafted in 2007 into the role of vice chair of
Marsh & McLennan; he now divides his time between that
job and research and writing about leadership,
particularly CEO leadership. He accepted the position as
vice chair of the $12 billion public company because it
was a “new challenge.” After a career often spent
advising boards, “I thought I’d learn something sitting
on the other side of the table,” notes Nadler, author of
the 2005 book, Building Better Boards. Nadler’s
comfort on both sides of the table may reflect his
academic training, which included not only an MBA from
Harvard Business School, but also a PhD in psychology
from the University of Michigan.
Early
in his consulting career, Nadler says, he was privileged
to work with “fabulous leaders who created fabulous
institutions,” including David Kearns, who led a turn
around at Xerox in the 1980s, James Houghton, who was
CEO at Corning for 13 years, and Henry Schacht, who
oversaw the 1997 spin-off of Lucent Technologies from
AT&T.
In
the mid-1990s, however, Nadler began to see CEOs who
performed well in their first seven or eight years “and
then suddenly something happened.” For example, Nadler
worked with Robert Allen, who served as CEO of AT&T for
nearly 10 years. “Had he retired in 1995, he would have
been seen as the hero for splitting and reshaping the
company -- but his career didn’t end that way.” Rather,
he was blamed for sparking a leadership crisis by
picking an inappropriate successor. Other failures
Nadler witnessed first hand included that of Richard
Thoman, the short-lived CEO at Xerox, and Richard McGinn,
who was ousted by his board at Lucent.
“That
started me thinking about the difference between success
and failure,” says Nadler. “I realized it might be more
interesting to study failure because success is
transient, but failure is reasonably permanent.”
Together with his colleagues, Nadler looked first at
“early” CEO failure, in which individuals had fantastic
careers before they became CEOs and then promptly failed
at their new job. Then Nadler became interested in
“late” CEO failure, in which CEOs who have a solid
tenure screw up at the end, often because of staying too
long or not having the right successor.
Finally, Nadler focused his research on CEOs who came
into the job, did well for a time, but, when the
situation changed, had a hard time adjusting their
leadership accordingly -- in other words, CEOs who
couldn’t move from one act to the next. “They fail to
recognize that things are changing, and often, they are
unable to assess their own capabilities.” With these
blind spots in place, the CEOs continue to press ahead,
widening the gap between their vision and the company’s
reality. “We call that ‘the death spiral,’” said Nadler,
giving the example of Thoman’s insistence on setting
higher and more ambitious goals at Xerox, even as his
leadership team was falling apart around him.
Feeding into this negative cycle is the hard fact that
CEOs may not hear frank words from their insular circle
of advisors -- or care to listen when the truth is
spoken. “Normally we think of learning-disabled kids,
but I see learning-disable executives, who lack the
ability to take in new information and determine the
insider implications for it.”
The Need for
Self-Assessment
The
most “heartbreaking” kind of failure, says Nadler, is
when CEOs try to change but can’t. “We are not
infinitely malleable. Asking a person who is 55 to act
dramatically differently, and pull it off naturally, is
setting a very difficult-to-achieve goal.”
Part
of the CEO’s task, then, is to ruthlessly assess him or
herself as the business context changes. “Do I have an
understanding of what’s needed now in terms of new
leadership requirements? Do I have a sense of my own
leadership capabilities? Can I understand the gap
between what’s required by the new situation and what
I’m capable of doing?”
According to Nadler, Kenneth Freeman’s recent decision
to retire as CEO of Quest Diagnostics at age 52, after
overseeing Quest’s successful spin-off from Corning, is
an example of good self-assessment. “He took the firm
from a period of trouble, in a troubled industry, and
created a great organization. He was able to say, ‘I
loved turning this thing around, and the next stage is
probably not a good fit with who I am.’” Interestingly,
says Nadler, Freeman is now with the private equity firm
KKR, working serially with companies who need a short
burst of turn-around leadership.
The
implications of Nadler’s research for the boards that
make CEO hiring decisions are several. First, boards
should look for what Nadler calls the “sustainability
factor.” This means assessing the candidates’ range of
experience to see if they can not only handle the
current crisis, but also deal with unknown future
crises. “Have they run mature businesses? Handled
compliance issues? Done a turn around? Grown globally?
That’s different than someone’s who has done the same
act over and over again.”
Locating such a jack-of-all-trades may be near
impossible in some situations, and in these cases,
Nadler recommends that boards consider the idea of a
“one-act CEO,” hired on the basis of a renewable
contract. “To find someone who is going to be a three-
or four-act CEO may be an unreasonable expectation.
Maybe we ought to make it okay to hire someone who takes
the company to a certain point, understanding that then
we’ll need a different set of skills.”
Such
a rethinking of the CEO role, however, requires a change
of mindset for both boards and chief executives. Early
succession “is not part of our normal view of the heroic
CEO, who stays on the bridge until he brings the ship
home,” says Nadler.
But
as one questioner in the audience pointed out after
Nadler’s talk, having a one-act CEO requires a
“multi-act board,” one that can fit the current CEO into
the board’s long-term vision. Nadler agrees, pointing to
how, in the past seven years, boards have become much
more involved with CEO succession, whereas before they
had only a signing-off role.
And
with this greater freedom to select the CEO comes a
greater responsibility to manage his or her tenure.
Boards, says Nadler, “need to face the facts when they
need to make a change.”
LEARNERSHIP: At Toyota, Success Is a Time for
Reflection
 By
Matthew E. May
If Toyota has a
singular, differentiating organizational talent, it’s
“learnership.” Learnership at Toyota is not separate
from the work; it is the work. By continuously
experimenting with how to perform your tasks better, or
more creatively or more efficiently, you constantly
raise the bar, turning ideas into action – action that
creates meaningful change. And that’s what leaders do.
One of the most
fundamental elements of learnership is reflection, or
hansei (hahn-say) in Japanese, the sole goal of
which is to understand. In the Japanese corporate world,
hansei refers to rigorous after-action debriefings and
reviews, where participants figure out what went wrong,
what went right and what could go better. The word,
however, has deeper cultural roots, and at its most
philosophical level, it means introspection. It is a
profound skill to master, and in Japan, education in
hansei begins in kindergarten.
Hansei is not
about confirmation. It’s not about celebrating success.
It’s a sobering reality check, even when a project has
been wildly successful. Were you to attend a hansei
meeting following a resounding success at Toyota, you
would be shocked at the tone of the meeting. It’s stern
and serious. Yes, the team greatly exceeded
expectations, but exceeding expectations also means
project members didn’t fully understand the process, or
else misjudged the impact of factors beyond their
control. Their objectives should have been met. And even
if they reached their exact target, the team must still
examine their course of action and the interim measures,
not just the final results.
The idea of
hansei explains what’s going on right now at Toyota,
which is leading the world’s industry in sales. Being
first in global sales was not Toyota’s specific goal, so
they’re not paying a lot attention to that distinction.
More important to Toyota is the fact that they have far
exceeded their specific sales goal of covering 15
percent of the world market by 2010: Instead, they
realized 17 percent three years early.
The hansei being
conducted now will result in new targets, for the fruit
of all hansei is new policy and the road to new policy
is lined with sharp questions. Has sales come at the
expense of quality? How will $3-a-gallon gasoline impact
long-term sales? Is an aggressive push for factory
capacity – with as many as four new plants planned over
the next three years – limiting flexibility at existing
facilities? All these questions must be asked and
answered.
Added to these
concerns is a lengthy list of strategic goals that
include eliminating cost differentials between gas and
hybrid models, hiring and training thousands of new
engineers, improving design processes to reduce
system-wide product glitches, and boosting operating
margins a full percentage point.
Toyota’s
definition of industry leadership stretches far beyond
just sales numbers. Looked at that way, there isn’t much
time for celebrating.
Author’s Note:
Matthew May is the author of
The Elegant Solution: Toyota’s Formula for Mastering
Innovation (Free Press, 2006). He can be reached
at
matt.may@verizon.net.
OPINION: Want to Be President? Start by Managing Your
Own Campaign
 By
John Baldoni
He is considered
one of America’s most respected men, even though he is a
politician. He is known for standing up for what he
believes in, even when that means bucking his own party.
He is, of course, Senator John McCain, contender for the
2008 GOP presidential nomination. In spite of his strong
issues-based leadership in the past, however, McCain’s
presidential nomination campaign has revealed that he,
like many legislators, is lacking in executive skill.
According to the New York Times, when McCain
was informed last month that his campaign had little
money left, he was “startled and enraged.” Fundraising
had plummeted, due largely because McCain’s contrarian
support for the war in Iraq and his stand on immigration
reform, issues that have raised the ire of both
moderates and conservatives. Issues aside, however, as
Time.com reported,
McCain was more focused on message and fundraising
rather than the running of his campaign.
Managerial
missteps
McCain is not
the only politician to founder as a manager. John
Kerry’s 2004 presidential campaign was a train wreck;
the campaign was roiled by the hirings and firings of
senior staff. In the end, his campaign proved
disastrous.
A smooth running
campaign should not be the sole criteria for executive
office, but it can provide an insight into the
candidate’s ability to mobilize others, build a team,
and hold a coalition together. If he or she cannot do it
with a small, paid staff and a team of volunteers, how
can we expect them to lead the country effectively?
As we look ahead
to the elections, then, what executive behaviors should
voters be looking for?
Thinking
critically. Watching the televised candidate
debates, you may be surprised at how few candidates can
articulate anything beyond talking points. This is not
due to lack of intelligence; it is due to a fear of
saying anything that may offend anyone beyond a clearly
defined enemy. Managers in the private sector know how
to shape strategies around vision and mission, but good
managers realize that corporate playbooks have their
limits. Discerning the right time for initiative
requires an ability to think for yourself.
Building a
capable organization. Leading a strong team requires
hiring professionals and deferring to them when
appropriate, but candidates should remain front and
center when it comes to major decisions. Corporate
managers know all too well what can happen when you
remain so far in the background that the foreground
disappears: You lose touch.
Acting
decisively. When things do not go as planned, as
often happens in politics, how do the candidates
respond? What they say is less important than what they
do. Sometimes they play hide and seek with the media to
avoid taking a stand that may offend someone. Not to
decide is to decide and, in politics as in the corporate
world, it is not a sign of leadership.
Keeping
things together. The candidate is the CEO of the
campaign; it is up to the staff to follow his or her
lead. If they disagree, they should voice their
objections to the candidate not to each other. Managers
from the corporate side know what happens when you let
intra-team squabbles bubble over: Work comes to a halt
and nothing gets done. Candidates have to focus their
teams on their primary goal: victory at the ballot box.
Embracing
change. Yes, situations evolve and even erode.
Campaigns, like businesses, can weather tremendous highs
and lows. A politician who cannot acknowledge, adapt and
survive is a politician that cannot bend. Whether change
means acknowledging a policy shift, deflecting criticism
or utilizing new technologies, candidates must be able
to navigate their teams through difficult waters.
Product developers and marketers know this principle
well: survival depends on watching new products and
competitors, adapting accordingly and embracing change.
Chief
Executive
Are successfully
run campaigns correlated with successful
administrations? Not always. George W. Bush’s two
campaigns were well-financed and professionally managed,
reflections of the executive style of the man who would
be the country’s first “M.B.A. president.” Yet those
campaigns may prove to be the high points of his career.
Bush’s administration has been less than successful due
to an unpopular war, mounting deficits, and the
mismanagement of executive office branches, such as the
Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA).
But while there
are exceptions, it is clear that how a candidate behaves
on the campaign trail may well presage how he or she
will act in the Oval Office. When Ronald Reagan’s 1980
presidential campaign made some serious strategic
blunders under campaign director John Sears, Reagan
fired Sears and appointed a new team, one that he
trusted because he had worked with them previously.
Reagan was quick to decide and act; these same traits
served him well as president.
So while
scrutinizing the candidates, we would do well to
remember that the next President of the United States
will not only be the Commander-in-Chief but the Chief
Executive, too!
Author’s Note:
John Baldoni is a leadership and communications
consultant and speaker, and author of
How Great Leaders Get Great Results
(McGraw-Hill, 2006.) He can be reached at
john@johnbaldoni.com or through his
website. |
